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Note of Editor-in-Chief 
This is the first Special issue of the journal Culture e Studi del Sociale-CuSSoc. The idea behind the special 
issue comes from this consideration: around the world, individuals are facing a critical moment, the COVID-
19 pandemic and its consequences require some reflections on many topics, often forgotten by scholars. This 
is the reason why many Italian and foreign scholars have been invited to give their contribution. Further-
more, now more than ever, it is crucial to share knowledge coming from multiple disciplines and that’s why 
it was decided to write an entire issue in English. 
For scientific and intellectual correctness, the contents of single articles refer to the situation as in mid-May 
2020. It is necessary to clarify that because this Special issue was published when many countries were start-
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This paper addresses the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the international order. 
The analysis focuses mainly on the role of China, the country where the epidemic origi-
nated and the main protagonist of the global transformations of recent decades. Among the 
possible future scenarios, our reflection contextualizes the role of the Asian giant in the 
framework of an international order already affected by major processes of political and 
economic rebalancing.  
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1. The pandemic. A new variable in an already precarious order  
 
How – and how much – will the spread of Covid-19 change the world order? 
Many international relations experts and professionals have tried to answer this 
question in recent months. Since the virus has crossed the frontiers of China, its 
country of origin, conjectures about the changes that the epidemic will bring to the 
geopolitical balance have been relentless, almost on a par with the extent of the 
contagion. The question is not an easy one if we consider that the coronavirus crisis 
erupted at a time of great international fragility. Since at least the beginning of the 
new millennium, the retreat of the United States, increasingly incapable of continu-
ing to dictate the rules of the international game, and the growing importance of 
China are the main agents and originators of the progressive decomposition of the 
political, economic and institutional system established after the Cold War. The 
unknowns engendered by this decomposition have already affected all the dimen-
sions of the world order, from the distribution of power and international prestige 
to the geographical scale of relations, from the strategies between the actors to their 
level of cultural and institutional similarity (Colombo, 2011, p. 4). The changes oc-
curred in these dimensions have fuelled worrying cohesion conflicts which, after 
having definitively revealed the decline of the West, anticipated by well-respected 
theoretical approaches (Bull, 1984), now risk finding an additional detonating fuse 
in the geopolitical impact of the coronavirus. 
Articles, essays, speeches and editorials are thus giving rise to a plurality of in-
terpretations, ranging between two opposing narratives. On the one hand, those 
who announces radical transformations for the international system, marked by the 
strengthening of individual States and an increase in tensions both inside and out-
side them. All this would exacerbate the antagonisms of world politics, by its na-
ture already conflictive, to the detriment of those forms of cooperation that in re-
cent decades have wished to present globalization as a mutually beneficial process 
for all those who embrace it. On the other hand, there is the narrative that sees the 
challenges of the pandemic as an opportunity from which to build a global infra-
structure of multilateral cooperation. Once they have overcome an obvious phase 
of closure, dictated by the vulnerability to which they are exposed, the countries 
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would reopen to a new kind of internationalism, to the benefit of the entire world 
order1.  
Among those who foresee radical scenarios of de-globalization and those who 
imagine new dynamics of interdependence, there seems to be only one certain 
point: the diffusion of the coronavirus has proved to be an event of enormous his-
torical importance, able to invest all the areas of interaction between the subjects of 
the international system. It would not be the first time that an epidemic has 
changed the terms of geopolitical relations. The Spanish flu, which broke out dur-
ing World War I, has already shown how the spread of a disease can become a po-
litical phenomenon and affect the management of international processes (Spinney, 
2017). Covid-19, qualified as a pandemic by the World Health Organization on 
March 11, 2020, has now crossed the boundaries of the mere global health emer-
gency and its impact on economic, political and even cultural dynamics at the in-
ternational level will depend on its duration, intensity and dissemination. 
The consequences of Covid-19 on the international order will also arise from 
countries’ responses to the crisis and how States decide to redesign their con-
straints. While internally, the emergency has gradually become a stress test for na-
tional health services and governments’ ability to restrict certain personal free-
doms, externally, what has attracted the most attention has been the fragmentation 
triggered by the pandemic. Measures such as the closure of borders, the exaltation 
of traditional borders, the restriction or any kind of exchange and flows, although 
justified by the need to contain the contagion, have reinforced processes already 
underway such as the reappearance of heated nationalism, the rise of authoritarian 
sovereignty and the return to rigid forms of economic protectionism. 
 
 
2. The Dragon’s Disease 
 
For obvious reasons, those who wonder about the possible outcomes of the pan-
demic have turned their eyes chiefly to China. The Asian giant is not only the cen-
tre from which the new viral strain has spread, but it is also the actor that in recent 
decades has contributed most to the transformation of global dynamics, to the point 
of becoming the main peer competitor of the United States (Colombo & Magri, 
2020). The health of the Chinese economy depends to a large extent on that of the 
international economy. Indeed, since China was admitted to the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in 2001, its economic fate and that of the world, especially the 
western world, have been closely intertwined. The Dragon is today an essential 
supplier of intermediate goods for many sectors, it is the world’s first customer of 
raw materials and, as if that were not enough, the economic progress of large re-
gions, from Asia to Africa and Latin America, is subordinate to Beijing’s invest-
ments (Sterling, 2017). 
However, the crisis caused by Covid-19 has affected China’s prestige and some 
of its efforts to achieve superpower status. The initial management of the epidemic, 
                                                          
1  On these different interpretations, see, among others, the Financial Times editorial, “Coronavirus 
has put globalisation into reverse” (https://www.ft.com/content/9393cb52-4435-11ea-a43a-
c4b328d9061c), the article in the British journal New Statesman, “Far from making nations more in-
sular, the coronavirus outbreak will transform globalisation” 
(https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/coronavirus/2020/03/far-making-nations-more-insular-
coronavirus-outbreak-will-transform) and the analysis by some renowned international relations ex-
perts published on Foreign Policy on March 20, 2020, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-
order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/). 
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with the authorities’ attempt to hide the severity of the virus, cast new shadows on 
a regime still far from recognizing transparency as pivotal for government action. 
At the same time, the issue has tarnished the image of modernity with which China 
seeks to project itself at the top of world power. After Sars – pneumonia that in 
2003 spread from small mammals to people – Covid-19 is the second epidemic of 
Chinese origin that jumps from animals to humans. These transmissions undenia-
bly clash with the modern-country profile that Beijing is struggling to project; 
rather, they highlight the delays still to overcome (Dassù, 2020). 
It is equally certain, however, that after its late reaction, China has responded to 
the epidemic with extraordinary initiatives. It is almost automatic to imagine with 
what “nonchalance” an autocratic regime manages to limit personal freedoms in 
order to impose drastic quarantine measures on millions of people to contain the 
contagion. But it is less obvious to take for granted the use of a surprising techno-
logical superiority pursuing the same objective. It is no coincidence that the images 
of the hospital built in just ten days to accommodate thousands of people have 
travelled around the world as an unusual example of organisational capacity and 
innovation level. 
The adoption of these measures has favoured the construction of a regime narra-
tive aimed at extolling successes against the virus. While part of the international 
community has renewed its criticism of Beijing, accusing it of concealing the true 
number of infections, China has shown the world the results of its measures. The 
rate of contagion in the country has been steadily decreasing and the authorities 
have proudly announced the closure of all temporary hospitals built to deal with the 
emergency. On March 10, President Xi Jinping officially visited Wuhan, the city in 
Hubei Province from which the virus had originated. Xi Jinping’s visit was laden 
with meaning: as proof of the beginning of China’s victory against Covid-19 and a 
sign that the Dragon was now convalescing. As proof of the recovery, the gradual 
reopening of economic and productive activities after about two months of paraly-
sis was also decreed. The “Wuhan model”, with the rigid measures adopted to con-
tain the spread of the disease, began to be celebrated by the government press and 
flaunted to the world as the example to follow to overcome the pandemic. 
Apart from the regime propaganda, Beijing knows that the fight against the vi-
rus is not yet won and will last at least until a vaccine is available. However, while 
many governments, especially Western ones, are still struggling with critical con-
tagion curves, China is showing that it wants to recover its ascending trajectory to 
the rank of superpower. The accusations of responsibility for the pandemic and the 
concealment of the number of infected have made this path more difficult; but with 
the worst (presumably) behind them, Chinese officials are determined to turn the 
crisis into an advantage and the national response to the coronavirus into an oppor-
tunity to relaunch the People’s Republic as a trusted and responsible regime. 
 
 
3. The Restart of the Asian Giant 
 
In line with the main purpose of China’s foreign policy – to build a human 
community with a shared future (Zhang, 2018) – Beijing has also flaunted its will-
ingness to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. A first and important example in 
this regard came in mid-March, with the decision to provide Italy with one hundred 
thousand high-tech masks, twenty thousand protective suits, fifty thousand diag-
nostic kits, one thousand lung ventilators and two million face masks. Together 
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with this health material, partly offered by Beijing and partly paid for by Rome, 
China also sent Italy a team of qualified doctors.  
Support for the Italian government is an action full of significance, as well as 
unknowns. At the beginning of March, Italy became the country with the most 
coronavirus deaths in the world after China and the first western state to decree a 
full-scale lockdown. But for Beijing, Italy is paramount for its plan for infrastruc-
tural and global economic expansion. The Peninsula is involved in the new Chinese 
vision of the ancient silk road (the Belt and Road Initiative) and one of its ports 
should allow the transit of goods from the Mediterranean to northern Europe. In 
March 2019, Rome and Beijing signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the 
promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative. On that occasion, many European part-
ners criticized Italy’s opening to the Asian giant and warned that China would in-
crease its influence throughout the continent. The People’s Republic aid to Italy in 
its fight against coronavirus, therefore, took on a deep political and strategic sig-
nificance. The support, moreover, arrived precisely when Italy was feeling aban-
doned by the other European countries which, in the same days, were either closing 
their borders or rejecting Rome’s requests for health equipment. The Chinese deci-
sion to help Italy has thus also highlighted the differences with which the European 
Union has dealt with the spread of contagion among member countries and the de-
bate on the aid to be given to Community countries to contain the economic reper-
cussions of the epidemic. 
After Italy, the Dragon has also assured its support to other States, bringing aid 
to over eighty nations around the world. Even the United States had to accept 
China’s assistance, thus enabling the country to exercise soft power across the Pa-
cific and demonstrate its willingness to take world leadership in responding to the 
coronavirus. This hypothesis would naturally give new lustre to Beijing’s interna-
tional consequence and appears strategically consistent because of a dynamic that 
in recent years has affected the holding of global geopolitical balances and that the 
current pandemic seems to have only further confirmed: the United States’ relin-
quishment of a leading role in world politics.  
It is known how Donald Trump, now grappling with various re-election pitfalls, 
has accelerated US disengagement from crucial regional contexts and global chal-
lenges. The extemporisation and contradictions that have characterized Washing-
ton’s international behaviour over the past four years have confirmed the “imperial 
fatigue” of the United States and the extent of its prestige crisis. This is a decline, 
experts point out, already evident after the disastrous decision of the war on Iraq in 
2003 and aggravated by the ineffective instruments then put in place by Barack 
Obama’s administration to remedy his predecessor’s failures (Colombo, 2018). 
Nevertheless, in the face of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the United 
States did not give up its leadership role, suggesting measures and political re-
sponses to the international community (Wulzer, 2017; Del Pero, 2017). This atti-
tude was lacking, however, in the face of the pandemic. Washington initially 
minimized the severity of the virus, then backtracked in the face of soaring conta-
gion and death rates, thus confirming that it prefers to focus on its borders and na-
tional interests rather than promote an international action plan. The White House 
has even managed to cause a stir among its partners, first by unilaterally deciding 
to suspend flights from the European Union, and then by offering millions of dol-
lars to a German pharmaceutical company in a clumsy attempt to secure a monop-
oly on a Covid-19 vaccine. 
The American withdrawal in the face of their hypothetical leadership against 
Covid-19 is confirmed by the importance with which traditionally less influential 
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subjects have found themselves pointing out to the world an alternative political-
health strategy to the Chinese one. The representation of a “democratic model” of 
tracking contagion and isolating the populations, has been assumed by countries 
like Taiwan or South Korea, while the United States seems to have been satisfied 
almost exclusively with exasperating diplomatic tones with Beijing. The formulas 
that Trump and his Secretary of State used to refer to the pandemic (“the Chinese 
virus” and “the Wuhan flu”) have irritated the Chinese without bringing anything 
to the competition with the Asian giant, neither in terms of the public image nor in 
terms of leadership in the face of the crisis.  
Beijing can, therefore, see in these errors and in the progressive disengagement 
of the United States opportunities with which it can recover the ground lost after 
the spread of the epidemic. The challenge, even in this case, is far from simple be-
cause it depends on a plurality of factors. Among the most important variables is, 
above all, the complex international economic and financial situation (aggravated, 
last March, by the disagreements between Russia and Saudi Arabia on the price of 
oil) which Beijing must look at with worrying forecasts on its growth estimates2. 
The above-mentioned 2008 crisis, however, has already shown how China can 
combine an exceptional availability of resources with an authoritarian state struc-
ture to transform difficult moments into advantageous opportunities (Villezca Be-
cerra, 2015). To these, we can add an effective communication strategy that por-
trays the People’s Republic as a leader in the world fight against the coronavirus. If 
in this fight – or “war for health”, as some governments have rhetorically called it 
already (Jean, 2020) – the Chinese laboratories were to beat those of competing 
countries and announce an effective vaccine first, not only would the international 
image of Beijing be definitively strengthened, but the Dragon would most probably 
completely overtake the West, marking the beginning of an international system 
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